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PERSONS—MARRIAGE ON THE HIGH SEAS—NORMAN v. NORMAN, 54 Pac. 144 (Cal.)—Plaintiff and defendant, with the intent and for the purpose of evading the laws of their domicile, went upon the high seas and went through a form of marriage, returning on its completion. *Held*, that the marriage was void, it not complying with the requirements of the law of the domicile, though the general rule is that a marriage good in the place where it is celebrated, even though the parties went thither to evade the laws of their domicile and return home immediately, is good everywhere; yet there being no law of marriage on the high seas this rule cannot govern. The marriage to be valid must be in accordance with the laws of the domicile.

PRACTICE—COERCING JURY—SETTING ASIDE VERDICT—PEOPLE v. SHELDON, 50 N. E. 840 (N. Y.)—At the close of a trial for murder, which had lasted seven weeks, the jury on Thursday returned three times between then and Saturday morning, stating each time that they were unable to agree. On Saturday afternoon they were again brought in and the judge addressed them, stating to them the importance of the case, the expense to the State and the necessity of reaching a verdict. The jury were then locked up again until Monday morning, suitable arrangements being made for meals, etc. *Held*, such action by the judge amounted to coercion.

PRACTICE—DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE FOR INTEREST—MEYER v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, 53 Pac. 434 (Cal.)—A suit was brought to set aside a contract with a city and to enjoin the issuance of bonds to pay for it. The result of holding the contract good and allowing the issuance of the bonds would be to increase the taxation of the city for a term of years. *Held*, that a judge holding taxable property in the city was disqualified to try the suit.

PRACTICE—INCONSISTENT—VERDICT, DAVIS v. STATE, 238, 77 S. (Miss.)—Two men were jointly indicted and tried for the same offense. The State produced but one witness, who gave exactly the same testimony as to each. *Held*, *Terral*, J., *dissenting*, that a verdict in which the jury convicted one and disagreed as to the other, was inconsistent and a ground for new trial.

PRACTICE—MINORITY OF JUROR—STATE v. BUTTON, 23 S. 868 (La. Ann.)—Where a verdict was given by a jury, which the accused had an opportunity to examine and challenge, a new trial will not be granted because one of the jurors is subsequently found to have been a minor.

SALES—WHAT CONSTITUTES A SALE—BAILMENT—JOHNSON v. ALLEN, 40 Alt. (Conn.) 1056.—The plaintiff delivered grain to the defendant under an agreement whereby the plaintiff was to purchase for and deliver to defendant for sale, the latter agreeing to pay plaintiff the cost price and one cent per bushel additional, during the month after its sale by him. The defendant had the right to sell to whom he saw fit, and was to be responsible for all sales, and collect bills for the same. Under this agreement it was *held* that the delivery constituted a bailment, and not a sale, and that defendant was not liable for grain received until he sold it.

TRADE MARKS—INFRINGEMENT—P. LORILLARD CO. v. PEPPER, 86 Fed. Rep. 956.—In deciding whether one trade mark is an infringement on another or not, "one is to be guided very largely by the judgment one forms by the use of one's eyesight," not in accordance with elaborate descriptions of the points of resemblance and difference. The fact that in isolated instances purchasers